This essay maps out a trajectory of the past and present of land acquisitions beginning with *terra nullius*, the Roman law that inspired occupation of empty territory to the European conquests and England’s Enclosure Movement along with the Biblical interpretations of acquiring foreign land in the medieval ages. The research then delves into the cartography and political economy of land acquisitions or ‘land grabs’ in India and tries to excavate the crustaceous shell of development rhetoric orchestrated by the national imaginaries of ‘nation-building project’, ‘high’ modernity and (gated) development. It also engages with the larger issue of state appropriation of the ‘commons’ or the ‘new imperialism’ (Harvey 2004) on the pretext of facilitating the flows of capital and economic growth. This includes industrialisation, infrastructure development, urbanisation and of late building industrial corridors and ‘smart cities’ that in effect ruptures the ‘social insurance’ and ‘subsistence ethic’ of the rural / tribal social arrangement. In the light of cases of forcible land appropriation by the state and supra state powers, this essay contextualises and examines the case of Bhatta-Parsaul (henceforth BP); the twin villages of Uttar Pradesh (UP) as part of an ethnographic study of the process of land acquisition along the Noida-Greater Noida Expressway.

The paper presents a montage of the epic movement for *bhu swaranj* (land sovereignty) and gives a detailed chronological account of the punitive and violent nature of state-citizen encounter at BP. Further, the paper also tries to analyse the veracity of land use patterns and current mode of urbanisation besides examining and contesting varied notions of citizenship, sovereignty, and ‘regimes of dispossession’.

**Keywords**: Bhatta Parsaul, Uttar Pradesh, India, land acquisition, development, farmer, government, urban.

**Introduction**

The saga of land acquisition is antiquated whose socio-political history and precedent can be gleaned from the dominance of *terra nullius*, the Roman law, according to which states could occupy any empty territory. This practise of forcible land acquisition was subsequently followed in the medieval age through European conquests and England’s Enclosure Movement. Forcible occupation of foreign land and enslavement of the natives is said to be closely associated with the interpretations of the Biblical verses in the Old Testament during 17th century England. According to Harrison (2005), the most important Biblical injunction that lay at the heart of *Inquisida* and...
which inspired the supporters of colonies was delivered in the first chapter of Genesis (1:28) as given below:

Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it: and rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky, and over every living thing that moves on the earth. (my emphasis)

Heated deliberations and contestations ensued in England regarding annexation and colonisation of ‘barren’ or ‘un-cultivated’ land for the express purpose of plantation and establishing colonies in foreign lands and which henceforth laid the foundations of Western imperialism. Drawing inspiration from evangelical incentives in large measure, these discourses became entwined with other issues like the notion of private property, social contract, and *ius gentium*. Moreover, the idea of international sovereignty and structural and material changes brought about in the wake of the Age of Discovery and Industrial Revolution also influenced the idea of appropriation, acquisition or annexation of land. This phenomenon has continued till the modern day but in today’s context has been joined in by large scale dispossession of land whilst carrying bigger stakes with more deft moves and extra supportive networks offered by the state apparatus, ruling elite and the dispositive; in effect, the bypassing of national laws, popular conventions and international practices have been enabled.

According to Fairhead et al. (2013), appropriation is central to the dual, related processes of accumulation and dispossession which can be of two kinds: simple capital accumulation and primitive accumulation. While in simple capital accumulation, profits accruing to capital are reinvested thereby increasing capital and the concentration of its ownership, in primitive accumulation, a more publicly owned nature is enclosed into private ownership and existing claimants are expelled resulting in separation of proletarians from land and nature and release of resources for private capital. Today, land appropriations especially in emerging economies have acquired a new semantics that is cloaked and paraded under the official rhetoric of nationalism, modernity and development. As part of the economic modernity, ideational hubs and developmental nodes like industrial corridors and special economic zones (SEZs) are expected to announce the triumph of finance capital and aid economic growth by creating ‘world-class integrated townships’ or ‘smart / global cities’ that generate productive investments and employment in manufacturing. In the light of the current discussions about the viability of the idea of ‘smart city’ project for emerging economies like India, many scholars suggest that smart cities are a threat to democracies as they bypass democratically elected governments and provides executive powers to bureaucrats and corporates.

Since the inception of the 1990s, a ‘hub and spoke system’ was created in which urban real estate funnel local revenues into a global financial system linking urban assets from different urban centres into one holding company based in no particular place and under unclear jurisdiction (Torrance 2009). The rapidly changing face of the urban landscape and a dramatic revaluation of land ownership in emerging economies involved a close nexus of the state, real estate mafia and the corporate world. The state acts as a comprador for real estate mafia and the corporate world which stimulates and emboldens neo-imperial tendencies. These developments were made possible due to the convergence of global crises in food, energy, finance, and environment. Powerful transnational and national economic actors from corporations to national governments and private equity funds have searched for ‘empty’ land often in distant countries that can serve as sites for fuel and food production in the event of future price spikes (Borras Jr et al: 2011).

In recent times, Industrial Corridors and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been viewed as generating productive investments and employment in manufacturing and create ‘world-class integrated townships’ or more recently, ‘smart cities’.

However, of late, agitation by Project Affected Families (PAFs) that includes farmers, tribal groups, forest communities as well as concerned citizens and NGOs across the country have forced the state to revise and reverse some of the previous policies and projects. These resistances highlight how critical land and resources are to people who attach a range of socio-cultural, environmental and political, economic
meanings to them. These acts of resistance and non-violent protests heralded a situation of ‘land impasse’ in few parts of India like Goa, Kerala, West Bengal, Odisha, Karnataka and Gujarat (Sampat 2016: 682) since those resisting refused to negotiate the ‘terms of inclusion’.

In India, land-grabs called so due its coerced nature have been underway but galloped after the onset of globalisation leading to ‘financialisation of cities’, a specific phase of the development of capitalist political economy followed by its ‘bourgeoisification’. As a result, India seems to be converted into a ‘rentier state’ with an institutionalised nexus with the ‘power elite’ comprising the politician, corporate/land mafia and bureaucrat. In ‘emerging’ economies, land grabs by domestic capital for industry, infrastructure and real estate have become contemporary ‘capitalism facilitating accumulation’ strategy. However, land-grabs also involve national and transnational governments. They are on the agenda of state/national planning and symbolise nationalism, modernity and development that are executed through neoliberal governmentality in the Global South by both the developed and the developing world as a national policy initiative but paraded and masked under the official rhetoric of development and modernity. Much of the land-grab literature in recent years largely focus on those by global capital and meant for agriculture (Borras et al. 2013; Margulis et al. 2013; White et al. 2012).

Of late, we witness an emerging process of deep and growing significance called ‘green grabbing’ (As mentioned in Fairhead: 2) i.e. appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends. Green grabbing is a phenomenon and can be understood as part of the vigorous debate on ‘land grabbing’ more generally, a debate which already highlights instances where ‘green’ credentials are called upon to justify appropriations of land for food or fuel (Ibid.). Green grabbing builds on well-known histories of colonial and neo-colonial resource alienation in the name of the environment – whether for parks, forest reserves or to halt assumed destructive local practices. Thus, large tracts of land are acquired not just for commercial farming, but for ‘more efficient farming to alleviate pressure on forests’. The massive expansion of palm oil plantations is not just for commercial biofuel, but for carbon-neutral fuel. In other cases, however, environmental green agendas are the core drivers and goals of grabs – whether linked to biodiversity conservation, biocarbon sequestration, biofuels, protection of ecosystem services, ecotourism or ‘offsets’ related to any and all of these. (Ibid.) In the process, notions of ‘green’ come to be defined and mobilised and invited a variety of actors which brings together otherwise antagonistic groups into new forms of coalitions and alliances. These include those between NGOs and corporates, conversationalists and mining industries, or ecotourism companies and military, among many such strange combinations (Ibid.: 3). Historically-embedded processes have left lasting legacies in rural governmentality creating what has been called ‘green governmentality’ (Luke 1997) and ‘environmentality’ (Agrawal 2005), whereby ‘the environment’ is constructed in relation to the exercise of power and control.

**Land Acquisition in the Emerging Economies: An Overview**

Development arrives with irreversible social costs and its hegemonic logic invariably entails a tragic trail of conflict, dispersal, dispossession and dislocation or in short a ‘tragedy of commons’. As a phenomenon and practice, the new paradigm of development is not only associated with expropriating the commons and life forms but also heralds the inception of capitalism and the corporate world as ‘second tier state’ especially in the global South. Development shares an antagonistic relationship with democracy which in effect goes against the principle of ‘inclusive growth’ and perpetuates the very poverty and inequity that it intends to obliterate. Today, involuntary land acquisitions or ‘land grabs’ in the name of ‘development’ is transforming rural areas into utopian zones of surreal wilderness. This is being facilitated by invoking the colonial principle of ‘eminent domain’/public purpose’ or deploying the ‘urgency’ clause for heading towards the imminent ‘gold rush’ to create SEZs in order to embark on ‘rurbanising’ and ‘smartifying’ private spaces and the ‘underdeveloped’ countryside.
The definition of ‘public purpose’ is at best elusive and the process of determining it is often arbitrary, usually non-participatory and based on criteria which are never clearly defined. As a result, huge social and environmental costs have often been written off in the name of public purpose. It has been used not only as a justification but also to exclude the displaced from the process of determining the acceptability of these costs and effectively from the very process of deciding on the reparation and rehabilitation mechanism. In this sense, forced displacement and relocation not only runs against the grain of participatory development and democracy but is also contrary to the spirit of public purpose.

Land question and its tangled and controversial relationship with economic growth, industrial development, social justice and human rights have been matters of serious concern and a major challenge for developing nations right since the days of de-colonisation. In the largely agrarian based economies of South Asia, land attains significance due to its criticality as the non-labour asset for the rural poor and the preponderance of agriculture as a means of livelihood, food security and sustenance besides its contribution to the national output. In India, land acquired an ontological value addition after the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1991 which created the Liberalisation, Privatisation, Globalisation (LPG) model and started running the under-developed and developing economies indirectly through various strategic interventions by transnational organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

Land was intrinsically linked with industrialisation and economic progress and this was bolstered after global capital became a paramount force in the so-called economic mainstreaming of the third world. It gained further import after the access to land, and land rights and its governance especially from the viewpoint of the legal empowerment of disadvantaged groups were viewed as crucial to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Rashid 2010) and now Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs). Three of the eight MDGs that is reduction of poverty and hunger, gender equality and environmental sustainability, critically depend on access to land and tenure security, which may also impact the achievement of two others that is universal primary education and combating HIV and other diseases. Later, the role of land was felt as a catalytic agent in securing durable peace and sustainable development and was included in the UN-Post-2015 Development Agenda. Besides, effective land management is also a critical factor in addressing the challenges of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Effective land governance can ensure restorative and redistributive justice in ownership and use of land.

There has been an intrinsic tussle between the very idea and philosophy of development and the mode, praxis and governance of developmentalism (For more, see Baxi 2008: 17). This has been so due to the pressures of the new economic world order and the free market economy which it bolsters as well as the frantic pace at which techno-capitalism toils. In the developing world today, characterised by ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2004), the ‘hidden’/‘human’ costs of development are becoming apparent in the form of ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998), dismemberment, impoverishment and deep seated resentment that induces extremism and violence. The neo-classical economics of the modern world inverted the ‘historically specific’ relationship between people and presented to us as a universal and ‘a-historical’ relationship between goods (Hussain 1991: 68). The reformed economic algebra was calibrated towards production and profits rather than people, their poverty and their rights and which finally ushered us into ‘regimes of dispossession’ (Levien 2015: 146–157). Globally, land is acquired for industrial farming to produce biofuels due to the crisis of fossil fuels, logging, tourism and aquaculture (see Ghatak n.d.) besides many others like carbon markets.

Emerging carbon markets may be fostering land acquisitions in the expectation of long-term increases in land values. Carbon markets may be relevant for afforestation projects, possibly including biofuels, and longer-term for the nascent Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) scheme that is being negotiated as part of the post-
Kyoto climate change regime. The scale and intent of these land grabs by the developed and developing nations amount to nothing short of a ‘new wave of colonisation’. (UNCTAD 2013: 235)

Land grabbers also include investment houses, private equity funds, fund managers, Transnational Corporations and the private sector. More significantly, in some countries, land grabs are carried out by national and local elites, competing land users like pastoralists, crop farmers and within families (Liversage 2011:5). Besides, a low public investment in agriculture and a decline in Official Development Assistance (ODA) during the 1980s and 1990s made agricultural lands vulnerable to commercial interests. As a result, it promoted harmful technologies, affected land tenure security of the peasants and converted farmers into a reserve army of wage labourers (Liversage 2011) and development refugees. In effect, such a condition leads to de-humanisation of labour and its social reproduction. Besides, these mega transformations at the local, regional, national and global level brought distressed reformulations in land related policies and divorced growth from social justice leading to rise in cases of human rights violations. Consequently, instead of effecting land reforms, governments particularly in the developing nation, began enforcing land acquisitions.

The case of land acquisition in India presents a perfect case of dialectics between profit motive on the one hand and welfare on the other with ‘corporate imperialism’ (Srivastava 2010) administered through a ‘nexus of legality, state power and neo-imperial capital’ (Sampath 2008). Land acquisition by the state and the corporate has been a relatively modern phenomenon where states turn into ‘venture capitalists’ (Palit & Bhattacharjee 2008). Such is the predicament of land grabs that the Indian state has been variously referred to as a ‘land-broker state’ (Levien 2012), a ‘speculative state’ (Goldman 2011) and a ‘rentier state’ (Sampat 2015). It seems as if the ‘speculative urbanism’ (Goldman 2010) to build a ‘world city’ has led to its financialisation. Forcible land takeovers have been a common practice for the state and central governments in India, irrespective of political and ideological differences which encourages violence by the ‘repressive state apparatus’ through states of exception. Lately, a ‘clever’ and conceited way to acquire farmland has been devised through ‘land pooling’ scheme\(^{10}\) which in effect gives false consciousness of consensus and approval of the land owners as in the case of Dholera, India’s first smart city (Sampat 2015).

The Land Acquisition Act of India, 1894 (henceforth LAA), in many senses replicates the ‘Enclosure Movement’ of medieval England. The LAA claims to glean its administrative, moral and legal powers from the archaic ‘principle of eminent domain’ according to which the state or national government can take private property for private use.\(^{11}\) The ‘urgency clause’ under Clause 17 (1) (4) of the LAA takes into account ‘items of national importance’ and facilitates ‘bypassing’ vital concerns of transparency in the process of land acquisition. This includes participation of and consultation with the communities whose land is being acquired besides the Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) of the oustees. The ‘urgency clause’ violates the 73\(^{rd}\) and 74\(^{th}\) amendments of the Indian Constitution which created the three-tiered Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) for devolution of power by the local self-governments in the country. Sections of the Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act clearly speak of conducting consultations with the Gram Sabha regarding land acquisition for development projects but which unfortunately is almost non-existent.

Displacement on a large scale is now increasingly occurring by other kinds of projects like thermal power stations, mining, dams, canals, industries, highways, airports, ports, nature reserves and urban development. In India alone, it is estimated that some 21 million to 42 million people have been displaced by dams and reservoirs (India Country Study 2000) and globally nearly 40-80 million people have been displaced worldwide due to the reservoirs created by large dams.\(^{12}\) According to few sources, the development projects in the last 60 years are estimated to have dislocated approximately 60 million people (40% adivasis and 25% Dalits of their land and livelihood) under an archaic LAA of 1894 and 75% of them are still awaiting rehabilitation. According to a World Bank Report, released on 7\(^{th}\) September 2010, a total of 46.6 million hectares of land were acquired between
October 2008 and August 2009. This has triggered ‘processes of exclusion and adverse inclusion’ (Nathan & Xaxa 2012: 5–7), leading to large scale social unrest and provided fuel to popular resistance movements like Maoism marshalled by the subaltern population and the oustees of developmental projects. The displaced people’s movements have challenged this view of displacement with physical relocation at its centre and have the historical experience of millions of displaced people at its core.

It is estimated that development projects in the last 60 years have displaced approximately 40 million people (25% Dalits and 40% Adivasis) of their land and livelihood under the LAA, 1894 and 75% of them are still awaiting rehabilitation (Mumtaz & Asher 2007:32). According to the World Bank Report 2010, a total of 46.6 million hectares of land were acquired worldwide between October 2008 and August 2009 with the largest number and area of land grabs reported from Africa (Ghatak, n.d.). Media reports note that Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique are among the key recipients of FDI in land in Africa. Outside Africa, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Indonesia) and parts of Eastern Europe (e.g. Ukraine) appear to be significant recipient countries. State-controlled entities other than sovereign funds may be more significant players than SWFs in international land deals. Chinese land acquisitions in Africa in excess of 50,000 hectares where deals have been concluded and project implemented. China’s ‘Friendship Farms’ in various African countries are formally owned by a Chinese parastatal organisation, but are mostly medium scale, usually below 1000 hectares.

This depletion of ‘common goods’ has triggered the ‘processes of exclusion and adverse inclusion’ (Nathan and Xaxa 2012: 5–7), leading to large scale social unrest and has provided fuel to popular resistance movements like Maoism marshalled by the subaltern population, Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the oustees of developmental projects. It is expected that such ‘provincialisation’ and ‘privatisation’ of development will precipitate loss of land and farm-lands due to urbanisation, deforestation, desertification, salinisation and rise in sea levels. Further, by 2030, it will augment rise in demand for water for agriculture by 30% and total global water demand could shoot by 35–60% between 2000 and 2025 and double by 2050. (Ghatak, n.d.) A massive shrinking of the ‘commons’ poses existential questions pertaining to land rights, sustenance and livelihoods of mobile communities like nomads, pastoralists, indigenous communities and other marginal and vulnerable groups.

In the Asian context, one has to recognise the importance of women’s farm work, land ownership rights and the consequent change in the gendered position of women and men. Instruments of human rights such as CEDAW and ICESCR together with the final draft of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have drawn attention to the necessity of bringing women’s rights to land and productive assets into the policy domain.

Yamuna Expressway: A Brief History of Rurbanisation, Smartification and the ‘New Dys/U-topias’

In the recent years, states have vied with each other for a greater share in the ‘gains’ of globalisation and economic prosperity as well as in the larger project of nation building through the latest props in infrastructural projects and brisk inter and intra state connectivity. This includes Special Economic Zones, Economic Corridors and Expressways apart from Industrial and Technological Parks that have become the ‘new utopias’ and the ultimate signifiers of the (un)-finished project of modernity (Benhabib & d’Entretèves 1997) Beginning around 2000, a flurry of nodal and link-up projects regarding townships, ‘smart’ and ‘sister’ cities and expressways were inaugurated which among others comprise the Taj Expressway, (name later changed to Yamuna Expressway) in 2001, Ganga Expressway in 2007 and the Kundli-Manesar-Palwal Expressway (also known as Delhi Western Peripheral Expressway) in 2006 in Uttar Pradesh and in Haryana respectively. Besides assuring better connectivity between the commercial and tourist hotspots of Greater Noida and Agra, Taj Expressway was aimed at reducing the travel time...
between these two cities from 240 minutes to 100 minutes and the project was to be overseen by Taj Expressway Industrial Development Authority (TEIDA).

The TEIDA was constituted on 24.04.2001 under U.P. Industrial Area Development Act 1976. TEIDA notified eight villages under this project to build expressway on April 21, 2001. A list of another 182 villages was added and notified on August 22, 2001, totalling 190 villages with another 151 villages roped in between 2007 and 2008. However, the largest notification was issued in 2009 whereby the state government notified the inclusion of 850 villages for the project which took the total number of villages under the project to 1,191. This was Phase I of the Project and included 584 sq kms but unfortunately the work was stalled in 2003 due to allegations of massive political and administrative corruption. The project resumed again in 2007 with a rechristening as Yamuna Expressway (YE) and so Taj Expressway Industrial Development Authority (TEIDA) became Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA) vide Notification dated 11.7.2008. YEIDA with the intention of facilitating an ‘ease of doing business’ became the nodal authority dealing with land and industrial development in the YE region. It covered a notified area of approx. 2,689 sq kms that came under six districts and was to be developed in two phases.

The areas earmarked for development included 236,682 hectares and were spread out in six districts, namely, Gautam Budh Nagar (GB Nagar), Bulandshahr, Mahamaya Nagar, Agra, Mathura and Aligarh (Shiva et al., 2011: 79). The scope of the project increased from 584 sq. km in Phase I to include more than 2,105 sq. km in 900 villages as part of Phase II as given in Table 1. Phase I covered the two districts of GB Nagar and Bulandshahr and Phase II included the districts of Aligarh, Mathura, Mahamaya Nagar and Agra. The Master Plan of YEIDA for the notified districts of GB Nagar and Bulandshahr are to be completed in two phases by 2021 and 2031 respectively as shown in Map I and Map II below.
Besides YE, it was planned to develop numerous townships, and land for these townships was being given to companies as special incentives to develop infrastructure in the area. More than a dozen estate developers, including big names like DLF, Unitech, Parsvanath, Eldeco, Emmar, Omaxe and Wave and many private builders were either in queue or allotted land to develop five ‘land parcels’ comprising of residential and commercial property along the expressway. The development was to affect almost 1.4 million people in 850 villages between Greater Noida and Agra. The Uttar Pradesh government planned to build eight expressways on a similar economic model.

YE is the most hi-tech highway in the country today and has been built to provide the commuters with a safe, secure and convenient way to travel between Greater Noida and Agra. The Expressway boasts of having state of art Intelligent Transportation Systems and state-of-the-art Highway Traffic Management System for a safe and secure journey. The length of YE is 165.537 kms and is India’s longest six-lane (extendable to eight) controlled-access expressway which connects Greater Noida and Agra. The project cost included land acquisition cost along the corridor of Yamuna River as well as 25 million sq. metres of land along the Expressway, following Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) model. Map 1 gives a detail of the five Potential Integrated Industrial Townships under consideration for Development and Detailed Master Planning. In the map below, No. 1 represents a Master Plan-2031 for a total area covering 247 sq kms and a population of 3.5 million and Numbers 2,3,4,5 represent Potential Integrated Industrial Townships under consideration for Development and Detailed Master Planning.

The plan to establish a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at BP and have Twin Cities and 100 Smart Cities in 98 cities across India are part of the government’s policy of economic growth and ‘rurbanisation’ as announced in the Vibrant Gujarat Summit- 2011 where 50 towns in Gujarat are to be merged in a rural landscape. (DNA January 11, 2011).

The larger purpose of these policy initiatives focussing on ‘rurbanisation’ is to stem migration from the villages to the cities and towns and bridge the rural-urban divide so as to foster sustainable, equitable and inclusive growth.

In the case of BP, Uttar Pradesh government played the role of a ‘middleman’ which bought highly fertile lands from farmers at a depressed rate and peddled out to YE as well as the corporate and real estate firms at an inflated price. An abysmally low rate of compensation was paid to the poor farmers of BP which exhibited the vast incongruity between the amount of compensation given by the state and the financial wheeling-dealings between the state and YEIDA, Jaypee (Jaiprakash) Greens and other construction companies. This led to igniting passions and rage among farmers and turned the two villages into a virtual battleground and a fertile patch for ‘politicking’ despite the fact that UPs land acquisition policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Area (Sq.Km)</th>
<th>Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GB’ Nagar+Bulandshahr</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>PHASE 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligarh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathura</td>
<td>2105</td>
<td>PHASE 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahamayanagar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agra</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 1: Details of Yamuna Expressway

Map III: Five Potential Integrated Industrial Townships under YEID
BP became an epic resistance movement against land acquisition due to series of events that had been simmering over the last 11 years. However, YE attained notoriety as it remained a pot boiler for months in major dailies due to the surreptitious and farcical manner in which the government acquired huge chunks of arable farmlands and unleashed a reign of state terror when resistance was offered by the land owners. Moreover, repeated incidents of violence, arson, killings, allegations of rape by members of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) and false charges under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) on the farmers were also reported.

Chronicling the Resistance Movement at Bhatta-Parsaul, Uttar Pradesh

Bhatta and Parsaul are two villages near the New Okhla Industrial Authority in Delhi and fall under Tehsil Jewar of GB Nagar District of Uttar Pradesh. The two villages are like peas in a pod and are taken as one for all practical purposes by the villagers. Bhatta and Parsaul together comprises over 10,000 hectares of fertile land with a population of around 800 families with majority engaged in agricultural and farm work and few working as government employees. Bhatta and Parsaul are among the few Jat (caste) dominated villages in a region dominated by Gujjars, with other communities including Muslims, Brahmans, and Thakurs. Bhatta village has a Kisan Inter College and a Health Centre.

Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA), formed in 1991, was mandated to develop the area in and around BP. The total earning of GNIDA mostly from leasing and selling land and property, was Rs.1,360.10 cr whereby it earned Rs.512.12 crore from selling residential plots, and another Rs.394.19 cr from selling and leasing land to private builders. However, a farmer from Greater Noida gets about Rs.8.2 million per hectare while the cheapest rate the Authority gives to a real estate developer is Rs 35,000 per square metre or Rs 350 million per hectare. The profit after land acquisition, cost of construction and other value additions is between 90 per cent and 110 per cent per square feet (1 sq ft=0.09 sq m). In 2008-09, the authority sold land for residential purpose at Rs 10,500 per square metre, for group housing and township at Rs 10,000 per square metre and for commercial purpose at Rs 20,000 per square metre. In just two years, the authority raised the prices to Rs 11,550 for a square metre of residential plot, Rs 11,000 per square metre for group housing, and Rs 22,000 per square metre for commercial purpose with the private players harnessing maximum profit.

Given the yawning disconnect and difference between the purchase price given to the farmers by GNIDA and price at which it was resold to the real estate developers and the corporate world, the protesting farmers sought a fair treatment. In this connection, the villagers wanted the District Magistrate (DM) to visit Bhatta and hear the villagers’ demands regarding the confidential, non-consultative and forcible land acquisition. Many also complained that the YEIDA had sold off lands in and around BP even before it had acquired them.

Trouble at BP had been brewing for the last eleven years particularly since 2007 when the land acquisitions began where sporadic protests were marked by clashes between the police and agitating farmers with occasional highway blockades and baton charge. However, matters went out of hand and became violent for the first time on 6 May, 2011 when the farmers had gone to lodge protest against the coerced land acquisition. In the meanwhile, two officials of the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (UPSRRTC), who had gone to conduct a road survey for a new bus route were abducted and taken hostage by the residents of BP as the villagers mistook them for officials involved in land acquisition. The villagers were protesting against the forcible takeover of their land and wanted a ‘just’ compensation which was commensurate with the price at which land was acquired by the GNIDA.

In a bid to rescue the abducted government officials, the DM ordered firing on 7 May which further worsened the situation. In a gun battle that ensued between the police and the villagers, two police personnel and two farmers died besides many reported
casualties. Between 9 May and 12 May, BP had no men as they had absconded fearing the police or were admitted in hospitals, or were under detention. Twenty-two villagers were sent to Dasna Jail in Ghaziabad. After the shootout, some corrective measures were taken by Mayawati government which, through the Union Ministry of State for Rural Development, disbursed Rs 50,000 each to the 16 farmers who were injured in the clashes and another 49 farmers given compensation of Rs 10,000 each (Oneindia.com, June 16, 2011). Around 110 farmers were provided the Centre’s relief through the PM’s relief fund earlier. (Hindustan Times, May 22, 2011) Furthermore, the UP government also withdrew criminal cases against BP farmers which were found to be out of state vendetta against the protesting farmers and landless labourers.

The BP incident had vitiated and politicised the atmosphere with anti-government sentiments. Soon, small resistance outfits like the Dehat Morcha, a rural wing of Uttar Pradesh Janta Dal (U), started a ‘satyagraha’ for couple of months in BP. Others like Kisan Union and Sarvadal Kisan Sangharsh Samiti (or All Party Kisan Protest Forum), Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) and few others with or without political affiliations sprang up and became active. Different modes of non-violent protest under a broad-based coalition were deployed by the farmers that encompassed maha-panchayats, dharna (sit-in protest), Kisan Bachao Satyagraha, Kisan Sandesh Yatra (awareness campaign) and Jail Bharo Andolan (courting arrest).

Political parties tried to encash on the local anti-government sentiments and cajole the villagers to vote for a non-BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) government, the then ruling political party in the forthcoming State Assembly Elections. Human rights organisation like National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), leaders of various political parties and social activists like Medha Patkar who visited BP to take stock of the situation and expressed solidarity with the protestors were either detained or arrested. A number of farmers were arrested and BP was marooned from the rest of the world after blocking road entry to the villages and imposing Section 144 which forbids more than five persons assembling at a place. Violence continued on the next two days, and about 2,000 policemen were despatched to the village on May 9.

Political magma began to spew on the incidents in BP from 11 May, 2011 with the visit of Rahul Gandhi, Vice-President of the Indian National Congress. After dodging the police, he undertook padyatra (walk as a form of protest) to the village and sat on a dharna but was soon taken into ‘preventive custody’. Spate of allegations were hurled by Rahul Gandhi on the Mayawati government and were seconded by Mr. P.L. Punia, Chairman of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. These charges included abusing, molesting and even raping seven women from BP (One India, August 22, 2011) besides damaging private vehicles and burning standing crops, crop storage bins by the PAC. As a symbolic gesture, Rahul Gandhi promised to give LPG gas connections to pacify the affected families. There were also reports of ‘missing’ farmers from BP. An FIR was filed in October 2011 against PAC men at Dankaur Police Station under GB Nagar, who were accused of outraging modesty of women folk in BP during the anti-land acquisition agitation by the local farmers (India Today, May 18, 2011). In retaliation, BSP led government had lodged almost one third of all criminal cases under IPC against protesting farmers. As a result, many farmers including women were arrested by the police under false charges of attempt to murder, kidnapping, causing hindrance to government work. They were later released in batches at regular intervals in a span of one year.

**Resistance, ‘Rural Rebels’ and Violence at BP**

In 2008, YEIDA started taking ‘physical possession’ of the land which meant that the farmers at BP were not allowed to plough their farmland and which later culminated into their forcible acquisition. There were threats of farmers’ eviction from their farmland and in some cases animal fodder was set on fire, water supply stopped and transportation blocked to make the farmers toe official dictates and succumb under pressure. In retaliation, residents of fifty villages in the nearby region joined hands and stopped work that
had begun on a section of the YE project. The support swelled in numbers and according to villagers, very soon a sea of ‘rural rebels’ had joined the movement. However, this was ultimately watered down by the para-politics and fissures from within those leading the anti-land acquisition movement. Many were left disillusioned by the leadership, and had finally decided to plead their cases on their own before the government for the release of land acquired by the YEIDA.

The farmers of BP were ready to part with land which was their only means of livelihood but with dignity and a ‘just’ compensation. They emphasised the fact that they had owned the land since ages and had their collective and affective memories attached to it. Trust between the state and farmers were broken in the very process and manner in which land was acquired. According to Section 5A of LAA, 1894, the land owners have to be ‘compulsorily’ heard but which was not honoured. This later became one of the prime reasons for the discord between the state and farmers, resulting in the resistance movement. Later, other concerns got aligned resulting in the splintering of the main issue as listed below:

(a) Inadequate Compensation and Related Issues
According to Mahalingam and Vyas (2011), the principle or philosophy that guides land acquisition in most countries can be classified into three main categories (a) the ‘value to the owner principle’, (b) the ‘just compensation’ principle and (c) ‘reasonable compensation’ principle. At BP, one of the prime reasons behind farmer’s resistance was the demand for ‘just’ compensation from the government for the land acquired. Unfortunately, the price offered to the farmers by the government was a pittance and nowhere close to the prevailing market price. According to an estimate, the government was offering 800,000 for a bigha (or 4 acres) to the farmers but was selling the same land to YE at 8 million, a 10 fold hike.19 The farmers at BP were willing to part with their land but only after the government offered at least half the selling price, i.e. 4 million per bigha. This was the final demand made by the Sarvada Kisan Sangharsh Samiti.

According to Shiva at al. (2011: p. viii), land was being sold to YE at Rs. 60,000 per sq. metre while the people were being offered only Rs. 300 per sq. metre, an increase of 200,000% in price and hence profits. Moreover, the UP government agreed to a ‘Residential Compensation’ at the rate of 7% to the farmers, which meant that the farmers at BP were asked to construct their homes on 7% of their original land; the farmers asked for more land for homestead. Later a ‘bonus’ of 64% of 600, i.e. Rs. 384 per sq. yard (or 321.0729 sq. metre) was offered to the farmers which was not a part of the compensation.

(b) Social Impact Assessment (SIA) Study
One of the pre-requisites for acquiring private land is the conduct of a SIA study, as per ‘The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013’ (RFCTLARR, 2013). However, the villagers of BP reported that no such study was conducted in either of the villages.

(c) ‘Manufacture of consent’ by the state apparatus
Inhabitants and farmers of BP were not apprised of the acquisition and the entire decision to acquire farmlands transpired within closed doors. In 2009-10, the authority floated a residential scheme under which 21,000 plots of sizes ranging between 300 square metres to 4,000 square metres were allotted, all in one go. (Bhatta Parsaul Farmers Didn’t Even Know Their Land Had Been Sold, May 11, 2011)

(d) The combined area of the plot is said to be greater than the total area of all plots offered by the Greater Noida Authority over the past 20 years. In fact, most of the allottees have reportedly even deposited the money with the authority and nearly half of them have already executed their lease agreements, says the report. But the shocking part is that the Yamuna Expressway Authority allotted the plots which it did not legally possess. Apart from the authority, more than 1,000 private builders have also been selling plots on which they have no legal possession. A copy of the layout plan released by the authority reveals that the J-block of the scheme falls entirely in Bhatta Parsaul. All lands
in proximity to this area have also been sold in the form of plots by the authority and the private builders and a huge chunk of them had not been acquired at the time of selling.

(e) Alleged Misuse of ‘Urgency Clause’ 17 (1)(4) of LAA, 1894

The land acquired at BP deployed the ‘urgency’ clause meant for constructing items of national importance or public amenities but not for ‘developmental’ purposes which according to Ramanathan (2011: 12) is ‘change of public purpose’. There was no such ‘urgency’ in the case of YE; the Expressway could at best be labelled as a detour and a link road from Greater Noida to Agra. Since the area was notified and the order was passed without notifying the farmers, the farmers were agitated as they could not even seek judicial counsel or state their grievances before their elected representatives.

In India, land is acquired under Clause 4, 6 and 9 of the LAA. However, in BP, ‘Urgency Clause 17’ was invoked which pertains to acquiring land for national defense and security purposes or Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) needs in the event of emergencies and natural calamities. This includes building public utilities like military base, airports, roads, hospitals and Section 4/17, 6/17 and 9/17 were deployed to acquire farm land at BP. Under Section 4, notices were served by the Yamuna Authority to acquire land from the farmers while Section 6 was used to get data from the revenue department ascertaining the details about the land that was being acquired. Notice is served to the farmers to submit their documents in order to get compensation for his land; the compensatory amount being decided by the concerned Authority. Lastly, according to Section 9, the farmer gets her/his compensation and the name is replaced by the new occupant, i.e. the acquiring Authority. In the case of BP, land was initially acquired through an official Agreement Deed called Karar Niyamavali. However, after stiff resistance was offered by the farmers of BP, the terms and conditions of sale and agreement had to be altered with immediate effect from June 2011.

(f) Convoluted Logic of Development - for whom and at what cost

According to the farmers and agricultural class, the present model of development is lopsided, antagonistic and therefore far from being equitable. Farmers raised a pertinent question as to why and how the government can think of alienating them from something that is meant for development of their land. Land was purchased by the corporates and land mafia at Rs 700,000 per acre in 2007, and priced at 2–3 million per acre as per the market price in 2013. Some of the villagers said that the entire land acquisition and real estate business was a smokescreen in order to convert black money into white. In UP, a total of 15,526 hectares of land have been acquired in Greater Noida region since 1991 using Section 17 of the LAC or the ‘urgency clause’ (Economic Times, May 23, 2011) According to the villagers, land was purchased from them at Rs 700 per sq. metre and sold to the builders and corporate at Rs 4,065 per sq. mt. The farmers enquired as to why they should pay for ‘development charges’ when in reality they were being uprooted from their own land. The farm land was being sliced away into ‘sectors’ to be turned into multi-storied apartments and corporate offices.

(g) Unfulfilled Collective Demands

In order to garner support, the farmers gave the battle cry ‘Jab tak dukhi kisan rahega, dharti par toofan rahaega’ (As long the farmers are unhappy, the earth will be in turmoil) and organised mahapanchayats (grand congregation) to decide on the future course of action. An emotional appeal was made through a pamphlet issued by the Sarvadal Kisan Sangharsh Samiti, against the forced acquisition in order to rally behind the Kisan Bachao Satyagrah (or Save Farmers Satyagrah) in front of the District Magistrate’s office. A list of demands released under the banner of Sarvadal Kisan Sangharsh Samiti on January 7, 2011 covering 39 other villages can be summed up as follows:

(i) Cancellation of the LAA, 1894 and formulation of a ‘new’ Act in consultation with the farmers.
(ii) Only half rakba\(^*\) of the de-notified area in the village to be taken for ‘developmental’ work and the remaining half rakba be developed on the model of a
farm house and handed over to the farmers in a time bound commitment so as to give full independence and ownership of the farmers over this piece of land.

(iii) The UP government to give compensation at the rate of 80% of residential selling price to the farmers whose land is being used for development related work.

(iv) Those farmers who give land for government’s development related work should be assured 25% reservation in those developmental programmes.

(v) The government reinstate its previous order of a re-establishment plan passed on 3 September, 2010 and assure a 50% reservation in all those establishments like private hospitals, schools, universities and technical institutions which have been displaced by the development policy.

(vi) Spaces like temples, cow sheds, schools, religious and cultural institutions, Land Management Committee (LMC) and habitation area should be spared from land acquisition.

The demands of Sarvadal Kisan Sangharsh Samiti finally tapered down to half the compensation amount i.e. half the amount at which agricultural land was being sold to the corporate and real estate agents.

(h) Leaving 'Habitation Area' (or abadi lands) and Job Assurance

The protesting farmers also demanded that the government leave the ‘habitation area’ and provide jobs to those farmers who were willing to sell their farmland. The main issue according to many farmers was regularising abadi land and allotment of 7% developed land. The officials had assured the farmers that their abadi (habitation) lands would be regularised soon and that developed plots equalling 7% of the land acquired would be allowed to them. They had also promised a bus service to be provided to send village girls to school. The Congress Vice President, Rahul Gandhi promised to create a favourable climate in the state in order to generate job opportunities for the victims of violence and human rights violation at BP. Unfortunately, like all other political promises that are baits to influence voters and vote bank, Rahul Gandhi’s ‘dreams for all’ was orphaned as soon as they were made.

In 2010, the state government after facing fierce resistance along the YE announced enhanced the compensation amount. According to Kumar (2011:20-23), the benefits included the following:

1. An annuity payment of Rs 20,000 an acre a year for the next 33 years in addition to compensation;
2. A fixed raise of Rs 600 an acre a year;
3. A one-time payment of Rs 240,000 an acre to those who do not opt for annuity;
4. Shares in private companies that acquired land equivalent to 25% of the farmer’s land;
5. If land was acquired under ‘land for development’, 7% of the total land so acquired would be reserved for housing for farmers;
6. If acquired for residential projects, the landowners would be given 17.5% reservation in the allotment;
7. Farmers rendered landless would be given a one-time labour charge of Rs. 1.85 lakh;
8. One member of each family rendered landless would be provided employment consistent with her or his qualification in the concessionaire company.

However, despite these announcements and declaration of benefits, the farmers and oustees were dissatisfied as most of the benefits did not reach them including the compensation amount. Furthermore, in a setback to the Mayawati government and relief to farmers of Noida extension areas (Greater Noida) in Gautam Buddha Nagar district, the Allahabad High Court set aside land acquisition in three villages - Devla, Yusufpur Chaksahberi and Assadulapur - and ordered that an additional compensation of 64.70 per cent be paid to them. It also added that the farmers should as well be allotted developed land measuring up to 10 per cent of the land acquired from them. In the three villages where acquisition proceedings were quashed, the land was to be restored to the petitioners (villagers), ‘subject to their depositing the compensation already paid to them.’ A special Bench of Justices directed the Greater Noida Development Authority and ‘its allottees’ not to carry out any development work, and the Master Plan 2021 would not be implemented ‘till the observations and directions of the National Capital
Region Planning Board were incorporated.’ More importantly, the court directed the Chief Secretary to order a probe by officers not below the rank of Principal Secretary into the decision to change the land use pattern; the allotments made to builders; and the land acquisition proposals. (The Hindu, October 22, 2011). Protests resumed once again in Noida following dispute over allocation of 5% of developed plots and 64% additional compensation in lieu of the land acquired and led to chaos and halted work at many construction projects in the area for several hours. The farmers were bolstered by the just demands that they are making before the government and said that they will continue their protest till their demands are met. However, they did promise and assured that it would be a complete non-violent protest and were adamant on even courting arrest by the police if force is resorted to by the latter. The protesters had not left the construction site and work could not resume till late in the evening.

**Conclusion**

In India, land acquisition for industrial development has become a talisman for distribution or redistribution of resources besides its current fetish with the ‘nation-building project’, modernity and growth. The research attests to a growing dialectic between land grabs for infrastructure development and urbanisation on one hand, and the growing rage and resistance against ‘accumulation by dispossession’ on the other which inevitable leads to ‘legitimation crisis’ and ‘land impasse’ in the emerging economies. Most of these acquisitions are enforced through bio-power and neoliberal governmentality of the state and involve the land and livelihoods of millions of farmers, tribals or indigenous and pastoral groups, marginalised communities like the dalits, minorities and landless labourers. Examples from many sites across the country provide ample proof of land grabs that include farmlands and forests, mines and mineral rich zones leading to ‘sponging off the land’. BP provides a case study in the intent, manner and beneficiaries of acquisitions which have resulted in large numbers of development induced displacements and which manifest in the violent nature of state-citizen engagement, sea of dissenting voices, protests and bloodied encounters. Legitimisation crisis (Habermas 1974) and the naturalisation of violence by the repressive state apparatus pits agriculturists and the marginalised community against industrialists and the government. But there have been ‘tipping points’ in the struggle against land grabs and reclamation of citizenship rights too which was precisely the case with BP. In BP, this was effected through ‘states of exception’ and repressive state apparatus besides other extraneous (f)actors but which provided sinews and steam to the resistance movement for defending *bhu swaraj* by the ‘project affected families’ (PAFs) or oustees / developers.

Hailed as the ‘Nandigram of Uttar Pradesh’ in the media, the anti-land acquisition resistance by the farmers at BP inspired and gave strength to similar protests by farmers at other places too against extra-judicial policy frameworks such as the LAA, 1894. More importantly, it brought to the fore the response of farmers and landless labourers against forcible land acquisitions which needs a pan-India solution in the form of a revised and more humane land acquisition policy. Most pertinently, it led to the passage of the Land Acquisition Bill in the Parliament. However, the case of BP also threw open fissures of personal political ambitions and caste issues where the Dalits (or SCs) were pitted against others.

The issue of privatisation of land and resources is related to ecological justice and forest rights as well as community rights over common resources which have given birth to a plethora of indigenous forest rights movements. Stiff resistance offered by the farmers and tribals resulted in the loss of thousands of lives who were killed by the state and dislocated millions who live like destitutes in urban ghettos. Emergence of a collective consciousness on composite class is evident in many struggles, both at the political and also at the economic production level. At the political level, new kinds of alliances and fraternities of diverse communities are slowly outpacing the traditional political alignments of dominant groups and state forces. It is in keeping with such positive developments that there have been formations of citizen coalitions and collec-
tivities like Land Rights Now and Global Call to Action on Indigenous and Community Land Rights. These informal groups are fighting to secure global land rights of the Indigenous people who constitute roughly around 370 million including 2.5 billion and who depend on land and natural resources for their livelihood and sustenance. There is a dire need to explore new livelihood regimes and ‘alternative’ modes of land acquisition and development otherwise we might have to face the horrors of extinction as a race. Examples from Nandigram, Singur, Plachimada, Jaitpur, BP and many others show that not only was land acquired by force resulting in human rights abuse, but that the tacit role of police and administration could not be denied. The displaced people’s movements have challenged this view of displacement with physical relocation at its centre and instead has as its core the historical experience of millions of displaced people.

Acknowledgement of land rights as fundamental human rights will be critical to ensure their full and effective realisation and to fight poverty, expand fundamental freedom and human capability. An effective land governance system – seeking to enhance access to and tenure security of land – must promote land rights as fundamental human rights. The struggles of people in different parts of the country have given a clarion call for the ‘recovery of the commons’ by communities in defence of ‘bhu-swaraj’, water, forests and livelihoods that have had a profound impact on the viability of the present model of growth and development. A similar struggle for reclaiming common land and protecting the rights of local communities is taking place in Bangalore at Amrit Mahal Kaval, a 10,000 acres of grasslands ecosystem which is home to endangered animal species and local pastoral and agrarian communities. This location is also where the State Govt of Karnataka and the Indian union wants to accommodate a massive military-industrial-nuclear complex and construct India’s first ‘science city’. A resettlement programme in order to qualify as development must therefore centre around: (i) enhancement of capabilities; and (ii) the expansion of social opportunities by addressing the social and personal constraints that restrict people’s choices. This would mean that resettlement with development entails questions of resources and rights that would affect the quality of life of the people.

Some of these struggles have turned into popular resistance movements with new and innovative means to strategise protest which have also become points of inflection including the agitation against land grab. In the recent past, a relatively unusual and radical form of ‘poop protest’ by the tribal members of the National Campaign on Adivasi Rights in Jharkhand showed the angst and seething discontentment of the tribal folk with the government’s land bill. The protestors squatted by the roadside to defecate on the printed copies of the land bill. Movements like Navdanya (literally meaning nine seeds), a network of seed keepers and organic producers believe in the notion of ‘earth democracy’ which is possible by practising five kind of swaraj (sovereignties) namely beejswaraj (seed sovereignty), annaswaraj (food sovereignty), jalswaraj (water sovereignty) and bhuswaraj (land sovereignty). The outrage against this logic of mindless development that exploits land and natural resources and displaces and dislocates millions, have compelled governments and other actors to re-think and strategise land acquisition policies. In the recent past, there have been increasing awareness about the relationship of land with climate change, poverty, hunger, justice, human rights and empowerment. It has been realised that societies that have insecure land rights have fewer opportunities to enjoy prosperity and achieve sustainable development.

Notes
1 Translated as a movement to reclaim land.
2 Loosely translated, it means land sovereignty.
4 The three terms are treated as co-terminus in this essay for there are more similarities than differences.
5 The Hindu. (2016, June 25). ‘Smart city project threat to democracy’. Retrieved from

6 It is the capacity of urban space or rather property ownership over urban space, to generate ‘rent’ by capturing socially produced value.

7 Adnan (2013) offers this as a generic concept that takes into account transnational, domestic and local processes of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession (distinguished as distinct phases of capital accumulation) through a variety of direct and indirect mechanisms and institutions.


9 Under this scheme, individuals or groups transfer the ownership rights of the land in the name of some land pooling agency.

10 For a detailed discussion on ‘eminent domain’ and its origins, see Ramanathan (2011).


13 There were different renditions on the number of villages acquired and other details. For more, see https://landmovements.wordpress.com/2011/11/05/yamuna-expressway/.

14 Courtesy: yamunaexpresswayauthority


16 Courtesy: yamunaexpresswayauthority

17 The “Just compensation” principle aims at providing the landowner with economic parity, primarily through monetary means such that the landowner is at an economically comparable position post land acquisition.

18 For more details, see http://www.indianexpress.com/news/now-yamuna-eway-farmers-look-to-court/825142/0

19 Area of field
20 Courtesy: yamunaexpresswayauthority
21 Kaval stands for grassland in Kannada.


WEB LINKS (Newspapers/Blogs):


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